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I. Introduction 
In the past year, while the legislative front was relatively quiet, 
Pennsylvania saw significant cases involving a trespass claim based upon 
drainage due to hydraulic hydrofracturing operations (Briggs), zoning of oil 
and gas operations (Gorsline, MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Resources, 
LLC, and Delaware Riverkeeper Network), oil and gas lease disputes 
(Butters and Slamon), regulatory challenges (Marcellus Shale Coalition and 
Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC), and title disputes (Woodhouse Hunting 
Club, Inc. and Clutter). 
II. Judicial Developments 
A. Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield Twp. 
The Supreme Court held that proposed use of gas wells was not of the 
same general character as public utility services facility, reversing approval 
of conditional use permit.  
The Fairfield Township Board of Supervisors approved unconventional 
gas wells operated by Inflection Energy, LLC, as a conditional use in 
Residential-Agricultural District in Lycoming County.
1
 Resident objectors, 
the Gorslines, appealed the decision to the Lycoming Court of Common 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield Twp., 186 A.3d 375, 380 (Pa. 2018). 
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Pleas, which reversed the Board.
2
 Inflection appealed this decision and the 
Commonwealth Court in turn reinstated the Board’s approval.3 Plaintiff 
objectors appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
4
 
The Township Ordinance did not list gas wells as a permitted use in the 
District.
5
 Inflection applied for a conditional use under the Ordinance on the 
basis that the use was similar and compatible to permitted uses in the 
District and was not permitted in any other zones.
6
 Inflection argued that 
the wells were a similar use to a Public Service Facility under the 
Ordinance, which was defined to include power plants, substations, water 
treatment plants, pumping plants, and sewage disposal facilities.
7
 The 
Supreme Court determined that the approval was not supported with 
substantial evidence that the uses were similar
8
.The Court found that 
testimony at the hearing was inconsistent as to whether gas wells were 
similar to a public service facility.
9
 
The Court held that the uses were not similar because the proposed gas 
wells were not by a utility or by a municipality or governmental agency, but 
instead by a private for-profit commercial business.
10
 The Court also noted 
that there was no evidence that the extracted gas would benefit the local 
citizens of the Township.
11
 The Court found that the Ordinance discouraged 
industrial uses in Residential-Agricultural Districts, and public service 
facility uses were only allowed “because they provide the necessary 
infrastructure for residential and agricultural development in the R–A 
district, including public utility services (water, sewage, electricity, natural 
gas, water treatment) as well as more general uses that support residential 
and agricultural development (e.g., hospitals, bed and breakfast inns, public 
recreation and agricultural businesses).”12 
The Court rejected the approval permit but cautioned that “this decision 
should not be misconstrued as an indication that oil and gas development is 
never permitted in residential/agricultural districts, or that it is 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at 381. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 383. 
 5. See id. at 387. 
 6. Id. at 385. 
 7. Id. at 387. 
 8. Id. at 388 
 9. Id. at 385. 
 10. Id. at 386. 
 11. Id. at 387 
 12. Id. at 387-88. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
408 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
fundamentally incompatible with residential or agricultural uses.”13 The 
Court noted that the Township could amend the Ordinance to permit oil and 
gas development in some of its zones.
14
 
Justice Dougherty, joined by two other Justices, authored a dissent 
arguing that the Court improperly substituted its judgment for the Board, 
which had implicitly credited testimony that the uses were similar, and the 
Court ignored substantial documentary evidence that supported the 
similarity of the uses.
15
 
Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Department of Environmental Protection 
The Supreme Court upheld an order enjoining an administrative agency’s 
enforcement of oil and gas operation regulations currently subject to a 
pending challenge.  
Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. concerns a challenge to 
executive agency authority.
16
 This is a preliminary decision related to 
enforcement of regulatory provisions that are currently being challenged on 
the merits in a parallel action. The Court’s decision is not the final word on 
the validity of those challenged regulations, but sheds some light on how 
the Commonwealth Court and the Supreme Court may analyze the 
challenged provisions. 
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
Commonwealth Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
enforcement of regulations promulgated under Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas 
Act of 2012 (“Act 13”).17 The Marcellus Shale Coalition (“MSC”), acting 
on behalf of itself and its members, filed a petition for review in the 
Commonwealth Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging 
the validity of certain regulations relating to unconventional oil and gas 
activities governed by Act 13.
18
 The regulations are located in Title 25, 
Chapter 78a of the Pennsylvania Administrative Code.
19
 The 
Commonwealth Court, acting in its original jurisdiction, issued an order 
enjoining enforcement of regulatory provisions pertaining to “public 
resources”; area of review, impoundments and site restoration pending a 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. at 389. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 392 (Dougherty, J., dissenting). 
 16. Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 185 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2018). 
 17. See id. at 1007 
 18. Id. at 986. 
 19. Id. 
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final resolution of the challenges to the regulations on the merits.
20
 The 
Supreme Court affirmed portions of Commonwealth Court’s order, but did 
not agree that injunctive relief was warranted on certain types of water 
impoundments or the challenged site restoration provisions of Act 13.
21
 
The public resources provisions obligated drilling permit applicants to 
provide pre-application notices relative to “public resources.”22 That term is 
not defined in the regulations, but includes “’common areas on school’s 
property or a playground’ and ‘other critical communities.’”23 As expressly 
stated, the permit applicant must notify each “public resource agency” 
which manages a public resource of the proposal.
24
 This would include 
playground owners and the like. The court agreed with MSC’s challenge to 
the public resources provision, concluding that MSC “raised a colorable 
argument that the regulations improperly expanded the list of protected 
resources” to potentially include all publicly-owned property, as well as 
privately owned property open to the public.
25
 The court concluded that 
MSC had satisfied the “clear-right-to-relief” prong for injunctive relief as to 
public resources which would include “common areas on a school's 
property or a playground” and “species of special concern,” which would 
include playground owners as public resource agencies.
26
 The court stated 
that these provisions gave rise to irreparable harm per se and, additionally, 
irreparable harm due to the “cost [of] compliance with these provisions—
costs that well applicants will be unable to recover . . . if this Court should 
rule in favor of MSC on the merits.”27 
MSC challenged the validity of the “area of review” regulations related 
to the obligations of well operators relative to nearby wells and the 
operators of those wells.
28
 The Environmental Quality Board estimated the 
cost of compliance with these sections was $11 million.
29
 That sum may not 
                                                                                                                 
 20. The statutory bases for this review can be found at: 25 PA. CODE §§ 78a.1, 78a.15(f) 
and (g) (“public resources”); 25 PA. CODE §§ 78a.52a and 78a.73(c) and (d) (area of review), 
25 PA. CODE §§ 78a.59b(d) and (e), 78a.59c (impoundments), and 25 PA. CODE § 78a.65(a) 
(site restoration). 
 21. Marcellus Shale Coal., 185 A.3d 985, 1007 (Pa. 2018) 
 22. Id. at 987. 
 23. Id. at 987 (citing 25 PA. CODE § 78a.1). 
 24. Marcellus Shale Coal., 185 A.3d at 988. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 989. 
 27. Id. (citation omitted). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 990. 
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be recoverable, even if MSC was successful on the merits.
30
 MSC 
challenged the provisions through a number of arguments, but the court 
found that MSC raised a substantial legal issue regarding the 
reasonableness of the monitoring and remediation provisions.
31
 
Determining that MSC established irreparable harm that outweighed any 
harm in refusing to grant the injunction, and concluding that an injunction 
would restore the parties to the status quo, the court granted a limited 
preliminary injunction.
32
 
MSC’s challenge to the impoundment provisions took issue with the fact 
that impoundments built in compliance with DEP regulations were not 
grandfathered in to the new standards.
33
 Notably, the court found that “the 
new rules arose, not from a change in the law, but from a change in DEP's 
interpretation of longstanding law; and existing impoundments permitted 
and built to DEP standards would have to be retrofitted or closed under 
DEP's new interpretation.”34 The law, itself, remained the same—the 
change was in DEP’s interpretation of that law.35 The court found that 
operators were denied procedural due process if DEP enforced the 
impoundment provisions applied to existing, previously compliant 
impoundments.
36
 Therefore, the court denied the injunction as to new 
impoundments, but applied the injunction to enforcement against existing 
impoundments.
37
 
As to the site restoration challenges, the court found that MSC raised a 
substantial legal question as to whether or not the site restoration provisions 
impose erosion and sediment control measure requirements on well owners 
and operators in excess of what is required under the Clean Streams Law.
38
 
DEP had described these provisions as “mere clarifications of [the] existing 
law.”39 The court noted that DEP’s position was undermined “to the extent 
Section 78a.65(d) purports to abrogate any exemptions contained in the 
Clean Streams Law.”40 As such, the court determined that MSC had raised 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 990-91. 
 33. Id. at 991. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 993. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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a substantial legal question and thus had satisfied the clear-right-to-relief 
prong.
41
 
Though litigation on the merits of the Petition continues in 
Commonwealth Court, DEP and the Environmental Quality Board appealed 
the order enjoining enforcement to the Supreme Court.
42
 
The Court’s standard of review on a preliminary injunction is for abuse 
of discretion, but where there are issues of statutory interpretation involved 
the Court review is de novo.
43
 Regarding the abuse of discretion standard, 
the Court noted: 
We do not inquire into the merits of the controversy, but only 
examine the record to determine if there were any apparently 
reasonable grounds for the action of the court below. Only if it 
is plain that no grounds exist to support the decree or that the 
rule of law relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied 
will we interfere with the [decree].
44
 
Under this standard of review, the Court found the Commonwealth Court’s 
order based upon reasonable grounds as to the preliminary injunction of 
enforcement of the public resources, area of review and a portion of the 
impoundment regulations.
45
 The Court, however, found that the preliminary 
injunction of the remaining impoundment rules and the restoration 
provisions was not supported by any reasonable grounds.
46
 The Court 
distinguished the rulemaking from the procedural due process issue noted 
by the Commonwealth Court. Here, DEP would not be making an 
adjudication of the rights of the operators and owners, but instead is using 
procedural mechanisms pursuant to the state’s police powers.47 As such, the 
Court reversed the preliminary injunction on well development 
impoundments. The Court affirmed, however, the injunction against 
enforcement of the provisions related to centralized impoundments.
48
  
Finally, the Court reversed the preliminary injunction against enforcing 
the site restoration provisions.
49
 The Court, reviewing the potential conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 994. 
 43. Id. at 995. 
 44. Id. at 995-96 (emphasis in original). 
 45. Id. at 997, 1001, and 1005. 
 46. See id. at 1005–06.  
 47. See id. at 1003–04. 
 48. See id. at 1005. 
 49. Id. at 1006. 
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between the Chapter 78a regulations and the Clean Streams Law de novo, 
did not find a potential conflict.
50
 The Court noted that if it did find a 
conflict, Chapter 78a would prevail as the more specific regulation.
51
 As 
such, the Court concluded that MSC had not demonstrated a clear right to 
relief in relation to the site restoration provisions.
52
 
B. Pennsylvania Superior Court 
Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production Company. 
The Superior Court held that plaintiff stated claim for trespass to oil and 
gas estate by oil and gas drainage from hydraulic fracturing operations 
across property lines, rejecting application of the Rule of Capture. 
In Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co.,
53
 plaintiff landowners filed a 
complaint in the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas against 
defendant oil and gas operator, Southwestern Energy Production Company 
(“SWN”), alleging that defendant’s operation of unconventional wells on 
adjacent parcels caused gas drainage from the plaintiffs’ property by 
hydraulic fracturing.
54
 The complaint alleged counts of trespass and 
conversion, and sought punitive damages.
55
 SWN filed an answer and new 
matter, alleging that the claims were barred by the rule of capture.
56
  
Discovery ensued and SWN subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that they did not enter the Briggs land, and that claims 
for drainage based on hydraulic fracturing were barred by the rule of 
capture. The trial court ruled in favor of SWN, holding that the claims were 
barred by the rule of capture, and the Briggs appealed to the Superior 
Court.
57
  
On appeal, the Briggs argued that the drainage of natural gas constituted 
a trespass because of the differences between hydraulic fracturing and 
conventional natural gas production.
58
 Briggs argued that the gas on their 
tract would have remained trapped in the shale formation, if not for the 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). 
 54. See id. at 154. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 154-55. 
 57. See id. at 155. 
 58. Id. at 156-57. 
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hydraulic fracturing, citing Young v. Ethyl Corp.
59
 SWN argued that 
hydraulic fracturing was distinguishable from the process occurring in 
Young and that the rule of capture should apply to hydraulic fracturing.
60
  
The Superior Court first noted that claims for trespass in Pennsylvania 
are controlled by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, which provides 
that:
 61
 
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of 
whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest 
of the other, if he intentionally 
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or 
a third person to do so, or 
(b) remains on the land, or 
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty 
to remove. 
The Court noted that trespass liability may extend to an actor “by throwing, 
propelling, or placing a thing” beneath the surface of the land of another.62  
The Court next reviewed the authority supporting the rule of capture, 
which precludes liability for the drainage of oil and gas from the land of 
another.
63
 The rule is based upon the tendency of oil and gas to escape from 
land due to their “fugitive and wandering existence.”64  
In Jones v. Forest Oil Co.
65
 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that 
the rule of capture applied to oil and gas produced with the aid of 
mechanical pumps. Additionally, the Court has held that the rule of capture 
applied even when a landowner placed wells near the boundary line of his 
property to drain his neighbor’s property, finding that the neighbor’s sole 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. (citing Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975) ( determining that rule 
of capture did not apply to displacement of valuable salt water brine under plaintiff’s land by 
injection of water in wells on neighboring lands to produce brine)). 
 60. Id. at 157. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, cmt. i). 
 63. Id. (citing Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130 Pa. 235 (1889)). 
 64. Id. (citing Browen v. Vandergift, 80 Pa. 142, 147 (Pa. 1875)). 
 65. 194 Pa. 379 (1900). 
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remedy is to “go and do likewise.”66 The rule was more recently recognized 
in Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv.
67
  
On the nature of hydraulic fracturing, the Court relied upon the 
description used in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren
68
: 
[Hydraulic fracturing] is done by pumping fluid down a well at 
high pressure so that it is forced out into the formation. The 
pressure creates cracks in the rock that propagate along the 
azimuth of natural fault lines in an elongated elliptical pattern in 
opposite directions from the well. Behind the fluid comes a 
slurry containing small granules called proppants—sand, 
ceramic beads, or bauxite are used—that lodge themselves in the 
cracks, propping them open against the enormous subsurface 
pressure that would force them shut as soon as the fluid was 
gone. The fluid is then drained, leaving the cracks open for gas 
or oil to flow to the wellbore. [Hydraulic fracturing] in effect 
increases the well's exposure to the formation, allowing greater 
production. First used commercially in 1949, [hydraulic 
fracturing] is now essential to economic production of oil and 
gas and commonly used throughout Texas, the United States [] 
and the world. 
Engineers design a [hydraulic fracturing] operation for a 
particular well, selecting the injection pressure, volumes of 
material injected, and type of proppant to achieve a desired result 
based on data regarding the porosity, permeability, and modulus 
(elasticity) of the rock, and the pressure and other aspects of the 
reservoir. The design projects the length of the fractures from the 
well measured three ways: the hydraulic length, which is the 
distance the [hydraulic fracturing] fluid will travel, sometimes as 
far as 3,000 feet from the well; the propped length, which is the 
slightly shorter distance the proppant will reach; and the 
effective length, the still shorter distance within which the 
[hydraulic fracturing] operation will actually improve 
production. Estimates of these distances are dependent on 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 158 (citing Barnard v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907) 
(1907)). 
 67. Id. (citing Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 
2011)). 
 68. Id. at 159 (quoting Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 894 
(Pa. 2013)). 
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available data and are at best imprecise. Clues about the 
direction in which fractures are likely to run horizontally from 
the well may be derived from seismic and other data, but 
virtually nothing can be done to control that direction; the 
fractures will follow Mother Nature's fault lines in the formation. 
The vertical dimension of the [hydraulic fracturing] pattern is 
confined by barriers—in this case, shale—or other lithological 
changes above and below the reservoir.
69
 
On the issue of whether the rule of capture applied to oil and gas drained 
with the aid of hydraulic fracturing, the Superior Court found only two 
decisions. The first was Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr.,
70
 in 
which the Texas Supreme Court held that the rule of capture barred a claim 
for trespass predicated on drainage of oil and gas by hydraulic fracturing.  
The Coastal Oil Court cited the following four justifications for its 
holding:  
(1) “the law already affords the owner who claims damage full 
recourse;” (2) “allowing recovery for the value of gas drained by 
hydraulic fracturing usurps to the courts and juries the lawful 
and preferable authority of the Railroad Commission to regulate 
oil and gas production;” (3) “determining the value of oil and gas 
drained by hydraulic fracturing is the kind of issue the litigation 
process is least equipped to handle” because “trial judges and 
juries cannot take into account social policies, industry 
operations, and the greater good[,] which are all tremendously 
important in deciding whether [hydraulic fracturing] should or 
should not be against the law;” and (4) “the law of capture 
should not be changed to apply differently to hydraulic 
fracturing because no one in the industry appears to want or need 
the change.”71  
A partial dissent criticized the majority position for relying upon the 
alternate remedies of self-help and pooling, which it argued were 
insufficient, and for reducing the incentive of operators to lease small tracts 
within a unit.
72
  
                                                                                                                 
 69. Briggs, 185 A.3d at 159. 
 70. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
 71. Briggs, 185 A.3d at 160 (quoting Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 
S.W.3d at 14–17). 
 72. Id. at 160–161. 
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The second case came from the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia which considered a similar claim of trespass by 
the owner for a Marcellus formation lateral that passed within 200 feet of 
the plaintiffs’ property.73 In that case, the landowners were under a lease 
assigned to the defendant operator, but the lease only permitted pooling for 
formations below the Onondaga formation, which does not include the 
Marcellus formation. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment 
arguing that the claim was barred by the rule of capture. The District Court 
denied the motion, relying upon the dissent in Coastal Oil.
74
 In particular, 
the District Court argued that the self-help remedy of drilling was 
insufficient and further distinguished the decision on the grounds that West 
Virginia did not have a comprehensive regulator of oil and gas operations 
comparable to the Texas Railroad Commission.
75
 Lastly, the District Court 
determined that the Coastal Oil decision neglected the rights of small 
landowners.
76
 The opinion was subsequently vacated after the parties 
settled the dispute.
77
 
In Briggs, the Pennsylvania Superior Court was persuaded by the 
reasoning of the Coastal Oil dissent and the Stone opinion. The Court 
concluded that drainage from hydraulic fracturing was distinguishable from 
the rule of capture because without hydraulic fracturing the gas was non-
migratory in nature.
78
 The Court cited the insufficiency of self-help because 
of the high cost of drilling a Marcellus well and was not swayed by the 
evidentiary difficulties in determining when a subsurface trespass has 
occurred.
79
 The Court further found that applying the rule of capture would 
enable operators to avoid leasing owners of small tracts.
80
 Finding that there 
was insufficient evidence of whether SWN had trespassed on the Briggs’ 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 161 (discussing Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 
2013 WL 2097397 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013), opinion vacated by Stone v. Chesapeake 
Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D.W. Va. July 30, 2013)). 
 74. Id. at 161-62. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Other than in Briggs, The Stone decision has only been cited in one West Virginia 
U. S. District Court case, which described the trespass issue as “unsettled” under West 
Virginia law. See Barber v. Magnum Land Servs., LLC, No. 1:13CV100, 2014 WL 5148575 
(N.D.W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014). 
 78. Briggs, 185 A.3d at 162. 
 79. Id. at 163. 
 80. Id. 
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land, the Superior Court remanded the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings.
81
 
Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. v. Hoyt 
Superior Court held that unassessed oil and gas rights were lost by prior 
owner at “title wash” tax sale of unseated land  
Plaintiff landowner, Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. (“Woodhouse”) 
brought a quiet title action against the potential owners of severed oil and 
gas rights from reservation in prior deed.
82
 In 1893, defendant’s 
predecessors, the Hoyts, conveyed the 937 acre tract in Tioga County to the 
Union Tanning Company, reserving oil, gas and mineral rights in grantors 
and their heirs and assigns.
83
 The grantors did not notify the County 
Commissioner of Tioga County of their severed interest.
84
 The property was 
assessed as unseated (undeveloped) land.
85
 
In 1902 the property was sold for unpaid taxes to the Morris 
Manufacturing Company.
86
 After the tax sale but before the tax sale deed 
was recorded, the Union Tanning Company conveyed the tract to the 
Morris Manufacturing Company, subject to the 1893 reservation.
87
 In 1932 
the property was sold again at tax sale, but was redeemed by the owner 
after the expiration of the redemption period.
88
 Eventually, Woodhouse 
acquired the oil, gas and mineral rights in a subsequent conveyance and 
brought the quiet title action in 2011.
89
 The parties brought cross-motions 
for summary judgment and the Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of 
Woodhouse, relying upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 
Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller.
90
 
On appeal, defendants challenged the sufficiency of proof of the tax 
sales, because Woodhouse did not obtain recorded copies of the tax deeds.
91
 
The Superior Court held that the record contained sufficient evidence of a 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. at 164. 
 82. Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. v. Hoyt, 2018 PA Super 78, 183 A.3d 453, 455 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2018). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. See id. at 456 (discussing Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 636 Pa. 344 
(2016)). 
 91. Id. 
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proper sale, including minutes of the Tioga County Court showing the 
acknowledgment of the sale deeds in open court, record of the sale in the 
Treasurer’s Register Book, and recitals of the sale in subsequent deeds.92 
The Court also held that the title was washed prior to the 1932 sale, and that 
any event, a redemption after the expiration of the redemption period would 
not prevent a “title wash” of the unassessed oil and gas interest.93  
Defendants’ argument that an undeveloped oil and gas interest could not 
be sold at tax sale was without merit. 
94
 Herder Spring barred defendants 
from arguing that notice was defective, as well as any other defects under 
the tax sales, after the expiration of the redemption period.
95
  
Clutter v. Brown 
The Superior Court held that reservation of “one half of the oil and gas 
royalty” was a reservation of one half of the royalties under existing leases, 
not oil and gas in place, and reservation terminated on death of grantors. 
In an unpublished decision, the Superior Court held that a reservation of 
“one half of the oil and gas royalty” was a reservation of one of the royalty 
interests, only, under leases existing at the time of the reservation.
96
 It was 
not, as Defendants argued, a reservation of one half of the oil and gas in 
place. The facts before the Court centered on a 1919 deed executed while 
an oil and gas lease burdened the property conveyed in the deed.
97
 The 
Clutters and the Lappings (“Landowners”) own two tracts of land in Greene 
County, PA, derived from that common 1919 Deed executed by the heirs of 
Louisa McVay (“McVay Heirs”).98 In June 1901, Louisa McVay entered 
into oil and gas leases providing for the payment of certain royalties and 
delay rentals.
99
 The 1919 Deed was executed while the 1902 Lease was still 
in effect. The 1919 Deed read in relevant part: 
Reserving, also from this conveyance one half of the oil and gas 
royalty the party of the second part, however, is to have the 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 458 (citing Bell v. Provance, 59 Pa. Cmwlth. 522, 430 A.2d 391, 392-93 
(1981)). 
 93. Id. at 460. 
 94. Id. at 461 (citing Cornwall Mountain Investments, L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs 
Tr., 158 A.3d 148, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Clutter v. Brown, No. 1542 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 4179747 at *5. (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 21, 2017). 
 97. Id. at *1. 
 98. Id. at *1-*2.  
 99. Id. at *2. 
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quarterly rental which is paid from quarter to quarter to prevent 
forfeiture of the lease.
 100
 
The 1901 Lease terminated and neither the Landowners nor the Defendants 
ever received a royalty from that Lease.
101
 Landowners then entered into 
leases with EQT in 2011.
102
 EQT withheld one-half of the royalty based on 
the royalty reservation in the 1919 Deed.
103
 The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Landowners.
104
 Defendants appealed, 
arguing that the trial court erred by failing to find that the 1919 reservation 
of one-half of the oil and gas royalty to the grantors therein constituted an 
exception of an interest in real property that passed by operation of law to 
the heirs of the grantors, being all Defendants.
105
 
Considering the 1919 Deed Clause, the Superior Court stated:  
We must determine whether this clause constitutes an exception 
of the Property's gas and oil from the deed or whether it is a 
reservation of the royalty payments received from the extraction 
of gas and oil from the Property. If it is an exception, as 
Gemmell contends, then it excepted a real-property right to the 
oil and gas from the deed that would survive the death of the 
grantor. If, however, it is a reservation, as Landowners contend 
and the trial court implicitly found, then it reserved a right to 
personal property—the royalty payments—that did not survive 
the death of the grantor.
 106
 
The Court then noted the distinction in terms: “A reservation pertains to 
incorporeal things that do not exist at the time the conveyance is made.”107 
“However, even if the term ‘reservation’ is used, if the thing or right 
reserved is in existence, then the language in fact constitutes an 
exception.”108 Notably, “[i]f there is a reservation, it ceases at the death of 
the grantor, because the thing reserved was not in existence at the time of 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at *2.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at *3. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. at *4. 
 107. Id. (citing Walker v. Forcey, 396 Pa. 80, 151 A.2d 601, 606 (Pa. 1959); Lauderbach-
Zerby Co. v. Lewis, 283 Pa. 250, 129 A 83, 84 (Pa. 1025)). 
 108. Clutter, 2017 WL 4179747, at *4 (citing Walker, 151 A.2d at 606) (other citation 
omitted). 
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granting and the thing reserved vests in the grantee.”109 An exception, 
however, “retains in the grantor the title of the thing excepted [and because] 
the exception does not pass with the grant, it demises through the grantor’s 
estate absent other provisions.”110 
The Court concluded that the 1919 Deed created a reservation of the 
royalty payments from the oil and gas leases then in effect.
111
 “A lease of 
minerals in the ground is a sale of an estate in fee simple until all the 
available minerals are removed; this leaves the lessor with only an interest 
in the royalties to be paid under the lease, which are personal property.”112 
The Court concluded that the 1919 Deed reserved one-half of the royalty 
payments, not one-half of the oil and gas.
113
 The payments, unlike the oil 
and gas, were “incorporeal things that [did] not exist at the time the 
conveyance [was] made.”114 Therefore, the deed created a reservation of a 
right to personal property that did not survive the death of the grantor.
115
 
C. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Res., LLC v. Cecil Twp. Zoning 
Hearing Bd. 
In this case, the Commonwealth Court held that a zoning hearing board 
exceeded its authority by imposing excessive conditions on an application 
for a use that was a use by special exception in the proposed location. 
In a panel decision on a land use appeal, the Commonwealth Court 
considered the reasonableness of conditions imposed by a zoning hearing 
board under a conditional use permit.
116
 Before the Commonwealth Court 
was MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Resources, LLC’s (“MarkWest”) 
appeal of a trial court order affirming the Cecil Township (“Township”) 
Zoning Hearing Board's (“Board”) decision granting MarkWest's 
application for special exception subject to twenty-six conditions 
(“Conditions”).117 MarkWest purchased a property upon which it planned to 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at *5. 
 112. Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Res., LLC v. Cecil Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 
184 A.3d 1048, 1054 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 23, 2018). 
 117. Id. 
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construct a natural gas compressor station.
118
 Markwest’s proposed use of 
the property was allowed by the Township's Unified Development 
Ordinance (“UDO”) as a special exception.119 MarkWest applied to the 
Board for a special exception under the UDO in 2010.
120
 The Board denied 
the request, which MarkWest appealed to the trial court who upheld the 
Board’s denial.121 The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded 
directing the Board to grant MarkWest’s special exception application.122 
The Board did so on remand but attached the Conditions to the approval.
123
 
MarkWest appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the Board and 
MarkWest appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
124
 
The Court considered four issues on appeal: “(1) whether the Board-
imposed conditions exceed the Board’s authority under the Pennsylvania 
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)” and the UDO; “(2) whether the 
Board is authorized to impose standards separate and apart from the UDO 
regarding where a particular use may be located; (3) whether the Board's 
conditions are unduly restrictive and result in disparate treatment of 
MarkWest's proposed use without a reasonable basis; and, (4) whether 
certain of the Board's conditions are preempted by Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) statutes and regulations.”125 
Affirming in-part and reversing in-part, the Court held that the Township 
exceeded its authority by imposing excessive conditions on MarkWest’s 
application for special exception.
126
 
The Court reversed the trial court’s upholding of the Conditions. The 
UDO allows the Board to “attach reasonable conditions and safeguards 
necessary to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.”127 The Board’s 
power in this regard is derived from the MPC. Notably, however, the Board 
lacks the authority to amend the zoning ordinance.
128
 Here, the UDO 
expressly allowed natural gas compressor stations as a special exception in 
the location of the proposed facility. The court determined that the Board 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 1055. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1056 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1054. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 1057. 
 128. See id. at 1060. 
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failed to make any findings that the compressor station would detrimentally 
impact the health and safety of the community.
129
 Without such findings, 
the Board lacked the authority to impose the Conditions.
130
 
Furthermore, the court found that the Conditions were an attempt to 
dictate MarkWest’s specific business operations on the site “under the guise 
of zoning regulation,” which is prohibited by the MPC.131 “Based on the 
foregoing, regardless of the Board's best intentions, those Conditions not 
borne from the UDO/MPC and the record are unreasonable and, therefore, 
are an abuse of the Board's discretion.”132 The court ruled that many (but 
not all) of the Conditions were unreasonable.
133
 The court did not reach the 
issues related to preemption, since it had already held the Conditions 
subject to those arguments were unreasonable.  
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P. 
The Commonwealth Court affirmed that as a public utility, midstream 
operator was exempt from local zoning ordinances in locating its pipeline 
and rejected challenge based upon Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights 
Amendment. 
In Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., the 
Commonwealth Court considered the appeal of a trial court order 
dismissing appellants’ complaint and denying petitions for injunctive relief 
against appellee, Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. to enjoin Sunoco’s construction of a 
portion of the Mariner East 2 (“ME2”) pipeline project.134 Appellants, the 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Maya van Rossum, the Delaware 
Riverkeeper, and residential landowners Thomas Casey and Eric Grote 
(collectively, “Appellants”), sought to stop construction of ME2 by arguing 
that Sunoco’s construction activities violated the West Goshen Township 
Zoning Ordinance (the “Ordinance”).135 The trial court sustained 
preliminary objections to the complaint raised by Sunoco alleging (1) lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction and a lack of authority to regulate; (2) lack of 
authority to regulate based on federal law (sustained as moot); and (3) that 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See id. at 1068. 
 130. See id. at 1068-69. 
 131. Id. at 1060. 
 132. Id. at 1061. 
 133. Id. at 1061–1080. 
 134. 179 A.3d 670, 673-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 20, 2018). 
 135. Id. 
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Plaintiffs failed to establish a substantive due process claim.
136
 The trial 
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
137
  
On appeal, the Appellants argued, among other things, that Sunoco is not 
a public utility and ME2 pipeline facility is not a public utility facility and 
that the Township’s Ordinance was not preempted by Pennsylvania’s 
Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) because PUC does not regulate the 
siting of pipeline facilities.
138
 The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding 
that because Sunoco is a public utility regulated by PUC and is a public 
utility corporation, the Township lacked authority to regulate the location of 
the pipeline facility.
139
 The court rested on its en banc decision in Sunoco 
I
140
 to dismiss Appellants’ challenge to ME2’s status as a public utility.141  
Once the court found Sunoco to be a public utility corporation, the siting 
of the pipeline is a part of the “reasonableness and safety of [ME2 that are] 
matters committed to the expertise of the PUC by express statutory 
language.”142 The court analyzed the Township’s actions under the 
principals of both field preemption and conflict preemption.
143
 Field 
preemption occurs when the legislature intends to occupy the entire field of 
an area of law.
144
 Therefore, any local statute in that field is not valid. 
Under conflict preemption, a municipal ordinance is invalid if it conflicts 
with state law.
145
 A municipal ordinance conflicts with state law to the 
extent it is contradictory to, or inconsistent with, a state statute. 
Furthermore, “a local ordinance will be invalidated if it stands as an 
obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of a statutory 
enactment of the General Assembly.”146 
Holding that the Township’s attempt to regulate ME2 is preempted by 
the Public Utility Code, the court found that the General Assembly intended 
the Public Utility Code to occupy the entire field of public utility 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 676. (The trial court overruled Sunoco’s preliminary objection alleging lack of 
standing). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 680-81. 
 139. Id. at 682. 
 140. In re Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., 143 A.3d 1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016). 
 141. Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 179 A.3d at 682. 
 142. Id. (citing 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1505).  
 143. Id. at 690–94.  
 144. Id. at 690 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair. TP., 105 A.2d 287 (1954)). 
 145. Id. at 690 (citing Hoffman Mining Co., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., 
32 A.3d 587 (2011)). 
 146. Id. at 692. 
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regulation.
147
 Moreover, the court concluded that conflict preemption barred 
the Township from enacting an ordinance prohibiting the pipeline because 
the Ordinance acted as an obstacle to the execution of the full purpose of 
the Public Utilities Code.
148
 
Appellants also raised an argument related to recent decisions made by 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Robinson Township v. 
Commonwealth and Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. 
Commonwealth stating the Court “set forth the clear limitations on the 
General Assembly’s authority ‘to remove a political subdivision’s 
implicitly necessary authority to carry into effect its constitutional 
duties.’”149 Those decisions recognized limitations imposed by Article 1, 
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the “Environmental Rights 
Amendment,” hereafter, “ERA”) on the General Assembly’s power 
legislate. Specifically, the ERA places a fiduciary duty upon the 
Commonwealth, as trustee, to conserve and maintain Pennsylvania’s public 
resources for all people, including “generations yet to come.”150 Appellants 
argued that local governments, such as the Township, shared that fiduciary 
duty with “all Commonwealth agencies and entities.”151 Therefore, 
Appellants maintained that “as to the public trust provisions of the ERA 
Amendment, ‘the General Assembly can neither offer political subdivisions 
purported relief from obligations under the [ERA], nor can it remove 
necessary and reasonable authority from local governments to carry out 
these constitutional duties.’”152 As such, the Appellants argued that the trial 
court improperly removed the Township’s ability to carry out its 
constitutionally mandated duties by finding the Ordinance was preempted 
by the PUC’s authority. 
Sunoco countered, arguing that “despite [Appellants’] contentions, the 
ERA does not grant regulatory power to municipalities where that power is 
preempted or otherwise prohibited.”153 Sunoco noted that the timing of the 
municipality’s action is key to their duties under the ERA, which Sunoco 
argued, “requires municipalities to make decisions and take actions they are 
already empowered to take, in a manner that satisfies their duty to act as 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 693. 
 149. Id. at 683 (citing Robinson Township, 80 A.3d 901, 977 (Pa. 2013) (Robinson Twp. 
II); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d 911, 931 (Pa. 2017) (PEDF)). 
 150. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 151. .Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 179 A.3d at 684. 
 152. Id. (citing Robinson Twp. II, 83 A.3d at 977). 
 153. Id. at 687. 
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trustee of Pennsylvania's public natural resources for the benefit of the 
people.”154 Sunoco added that the PUC and the Department of 
Environmental Protection are empowered to exercise ERA duties over the 
ME2 pipeline and, in fact, had done so.
155
 
The court declined to adopt Appellants’ argument on the Township’s 
constitutional duties under the ERA for three reasons: first, both Robinson 
Twp. II and PEDF were distinguishable from the present facts because 
neither dealt with public utility services or facilities regulated by PUC.
156
 
Second, the court found that Appellants “do not explain how the [ERA] 
impacts long-standing, pre-existing law involving regulation of public 
utilities, without expressly referring to the topic.”157 Noting that Robinson 
Twp. II and PEDF dealt with very recent enactments by the General 
Assembly, the court found that Appellants “ignore the comparative timing 
of the onset of legal duties, although such timing is usually a matter of 
significan[t] legal analysis.”158 Finally, the court did not find that 
Appellants showed how the Ordinance furthered the Township’s ERA 
trustee duties or related to conserving public natural resources.
159
 As such, 
the court did not find that the ERA protected the Ordinance from the 
preemption arguments advanced by Sunoco. 
D. Pennsylvania Federal Courts 
Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n 
The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of mineral owner’s claim for 
declaratory judgment against DRBC regulation of unconventional natural 
gas operations.  
Mineral owner Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC (“Wayne”) 
brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Delaware River Basin 
Commission (“DRBC”) seeking a declaration that the DRBC did not have 
the authority to require Wayne to obtain approval to drill and complete 
unconventional gas wells in Wayne County, Pennsylvania.
160
 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Id. (emphasis added). 
 155. See id. at 688. 
 156. Id. at 695–96. 
 157. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 894 F.3d 509, 
515 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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The DRBC was created in 1961 to administer the Delaware River Basin 
Compact (“Compact”) between Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.
161
 The Compact gives the Commission a broad range of 
powers to protect water quantity and quality within the Basin. Article 3 of 
the Compact requires the Commission to create a comprehensive plan for 
the immediate and long-range development and uses of the water resources 
of the Delaware River Basin.
162
 The plan must include all public and private 
projects and facilities which are required, in the judgment of the DRBC, 
“for the optimum planning, development, conservation, utilization, 
management and control of the water resources of the [B]asin to meet 
present and future needs[.]”163 In 2009 the Executive Director of the DRBC 
issued a moratorium on natural gas “fracking” projects without prior DRBC 
approval. The DRBC has not issued any final regulations governing the 
review of unconventional gas well projects.
164
 
The DRBC filed a motion to dismiss Wayne’s complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because the claim was not ripe and Wayne 
lacked standing. In the alternative, the DRBC sought a dismissal under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “because there was no final 
agency action and Wayne did not exhaust available administrative 
remedies.”165 The District Court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Wayne had alleged an economic 
injury and was ripe because it only sought a declaratory judgment.
166
 The 
District Court also found that Wayne had not failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies, again citing the limited nature of the declaratory 
relief sought by Wayne.
167
 However, the District Court sua sponte 
dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6), because on the merits, the 
definition of “project” under the Compact included the planned drilling 
operations.
168
  
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (“Third 
Circuit”), first considered the ripeness of Wayne’s claim. Ripeness is 
“guided by three main considerations: the adversity of the parties’ interests, 
the conclusiveness of the judgment, and the practical utility of that 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (quoting Joint App. at 386, § 13.1.). 
 164. Id. at 518. 
 165. Id. at 519. 
 166. Id. at 520-21. 
 167. Id. at 521. 
 168. Id. 
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judgment.”169 The Third Circuit concluded that there was adversity, given 
the costs of Wayne’s compliance with the DRBC’s required showings 
related to water usage and the risks of fines from proceeding without DRBC 
approval.
170
 Second, there were sufficient facts to obtain a conclusive legal 
judgment given the purely legal nature of a declaration as to the DRBC’s 
jurisdiction.
171
 Third, a legal ruling would provide practical utility by 
clarifying the legal relationship between natural gas companies and the 
DRBC.
172
 The Third Circuit held that Wayne’s claim was ripe.173  
The Third Circuit also held that Wayne had standing, based upon the 
legal requirements imposed by the DRBC, the burden on Wayne realizing 
the market value of its mineral resources, and the threat of sanctions for 
noncompliance fulfilling the three elements of standing.
174
 In addition, 
because Wayne was not challenging a DRBC action, but the proper 
interpretation of the Compact, the “final agency action” requirement was 
inapplicable and likewise the alleged failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.
175
 
Last, the Third Circuit considered the merits of Wayne’s argument that 
drilling operations do not constitute a “project” under the Compact. The 
Compact defines a “project” as 
any work, service or activity which is separately planned, 
financed, or identified by the [C]ommission, or any separate 
facility undertaken or to be undertaken within a specified 
area, for the conservation, utilization, control, development or 
management of water resources which can be established and 
utilized independently or as an addition to an existing facility, 
and can be considered as a separate entity for purposes of 
evaluation[.]
176
 
The Third Circuit was persuaded by Wayne’s argument that the DRBC read 
the word “for” out of the definition, since water use is incidental to natural 
gas development, not a purpose of the activity. The DRBC’s interpretation 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. at 522 (citing Marathon Petroleum Corp. v. Sec'y of Fin. for Delaware, 876 F.3d 
481, 496 (3d Cir. 2017)). 
 170. Id. at 523. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 524. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 524-25 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)). 
 175. Id. at 526. 
 176. Id. at 529 (citing Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g) (emphasis added)). 
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of “project” would include any activity that uses water. In addition, the 
court noted that it was questionable whether the quantity of water used in 
hydrofracturing operations is greater than that used in other operations that 
the DRBC has made no effort to regulate.
177
 However, the Court thought 
there was some force to the DRBC’s argument that exempting 
hydrofracturing projects would treat them different from other regulated 
industrial water uses. The Third Circuit found that the definition of 
“project” was ambiguous, denied the DRBC’s motion to dismiss, and 
remanded the case to the District Court for additional fact-finding.
178
 
Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC 
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied 
defendant operator’s motion to dismiss lessors’ claim that lease terminated 
due to failure to diligently develop leasehold 
Plaintiff landowners leased multiple tracts in Tioga County, 
Pennsylvania to lessee, who assigned those leases to operators, who, in 
turn, assigned the leases to operator defendant. The lease habendum clauses 
provided that the leases would be extended beyond the initial primary term 
if any of several conditions were satisfied, including if “drilling operations 
continue with due diligence[.]”179 “Operations” were defined in the leases 
to include  
any of the following: dirt work, building of roads and locations, 
drilling, testing, completing, reworking, recompleting, 
deepening, plugging back, repairing, abandoning or dewatering 
(meaning pumping or flowing of water and/or associated 
hydrocarbons from a well) of a well in search of or in an 
endeavor to obtain, increase or restore and/or market or render 
marketable or more valuable production of oil or gas, and/or 
production, actual or constructive, of oil or gas.
180
 
Prior to the expiration of the leases’ primary terms on December 8, 2015, 
portions of leases were unitized in two drilling units. On October 10, 2016, 
plaintiffs requested that defendant surrender the leases.
181
 Defendant 
rejected the request, asserting that drilling operations on the two units were 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id. at 530. 
 178. Id. at 533-34. 
 179. Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 4:17-CV-797, 2018 WL 2766290, at *1 (M.D. 
Pa. June 8, 2018). 
 180. Id. at *2. 
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sufficient to extend the leases.
182
 Plaintiff filed claims for quiet title and 
declaratory judgment and defendant removed the claims to the District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on diversity grounds.
183
 
Defendant then filed a motion for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for 
non-compliance with the notice provisions under the leases and because its 
activities were sufficient to extend the leases as a matter of law.
184
 
The notice clause provided that “the leases shall not be terminated for 
[lessee’s] failure to perform ‘unless such obligation, covenant or condition 
remains unsatisfied and unperformed for a period of one year following the 
express and specific written demand . . . for such satisfaction and 
performance.’”185 The District Court concluded that the clause was 
inapplicable to an expiration of the leases under the habendum clause, 
which was akin to an automatic reversion of a fee simple determinable.
186
 
Plaintiffs alleged that after unitization one spudded well was not further 
developed and the drilling permit expired.
187
 Defendant argued that its 
activities, including setting containment on the well pad, performing a 
cement bond log, removing a bridge plug, and running a bit and scraper in 
the wellbore were sufficient to extend the leases.
188
 The District Court held 
that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to survive Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, as defendant’s due diligence was a question reserved for the fact-
finder.
189
  
Slamon v. Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC 
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied 
defendant operators’ motion to dismiss lessor’s claims for breach of royalty 
clause in leases by basing royalty payments on improper prices, and 
deducting post-production costs, but dismissed a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  
Plaintiff oil and gas lessor brought a class action against defendants, 
Reliance Marcellus II, LLC, Reliance Holdings USA, Inc. (collectively 
“Reliance”) and Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC (“Carrizo”) alleging that: a) the 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at *6. 
 186. Id. (citing T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 276 (Pa. 2012)). 
 187. Id. at *8. 
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royalties paid to the plaintiffs under their oil and gas leases were improperly 
calculated; b) that Reliance and Carrizo breached the lease by 
miscalculating the production royalty as well as deducting fees and post-
production costs incurred from the sale of gas to a third party from the 
royalty paid to Plaintiff; c) that Reliance and Carrizo breach the implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in their contract with Plaintiff; and d) 
that Reliance and Carrizo breached their fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff.
190
 
Carrizo and Reliance filed motions to dismiss the complaint.
191
  
The district court first considered the claim that royalty was paid upon an 
improper price. The lease’s royalty clause provided that 
[t]he value of oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon production shall be 
determined on the basis of the greater of (i) the prevailing local 
market price at the time of sale or use, or, NYMEX spot price as 
published at the time of sale, whichever is greater, or (ii) the 
price paid to Lessee from the sale or use of the gas, including 
proceeds and any other thing of value received by Lessee; 
provided, however, that when gas production is sold in an arms-
length sale transaction with an unaffiliated third party, the value 
of such gas production shall be the price paid to Lessee.
192
 
The parties contested whether the final proviso only modified provision (ii) 
(as advocated by Plaintiff) or whether it modified the entire provision (as 
advocated by Defendants).
193
 The district court found that the production 
royalty payment and valuation terms of the lease were susceptible to 
multiple reasonable interpretations and denied the Defendants’ motion.194 
Second, the district court considered Plaintiff’s claims that post-
production costs were improperly deducted. The relevant provision in the 
leases stated that “Lessee shall pay Lessor the following royalty (the 
‘Royalty’), free of all costs, whether pre-production or post-production.”195 
The lease did not define the term “post-production costs.”196 Reliance and 
Carrizo agreed with Plaintiff that the royalty provision did not allow them 
to deduct post-production costs, but Reliance and Carrizo argued that the 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Slamon v. Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2187, 2017 WL 3877856, at *1-
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allegations in the complaint did not allege that they deducted post-
production costs from Plaintiff’s royalties.197 Instead, Defendants noted that 
the complaint alleged that the third party buying the gas deducted its costs 
in calculating the price paid to Reliance and Carrizo. As such, Reliance and 
Carrizo argued that the costs incurred by the third party who purchased the 
gas did not fall within the definition of “post-production costs.”198 
The district court found that the term “post-production costs” was not 
necessarily limited to only those production expenses incurred directly by 
Reliance and Carrizo. The district court concluded that because “the lease 
does not clearly limit “post-production costs” to only those production 
expenses incurred directly by Defendants—as opposed to those incurred 
directly to third parties and passed onto Defendants—Plaintiff has 
adequately pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract.”199 
Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendants’ accepted sale prices for natural 
gas that were well below market value, for natural gas, breached the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
200
 The district court noted that 
the lease did not constrain Defendants’ discretion in setting a sales price for 
gas. Defendants argued that as a consequence they had no duty to sell at 
any particular price. However, the district court held that Plaintiff 
sufficiently alleged a claim: “Plaintiff’s claim is […] that Defendants’ are 
nonetheless required by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
to exercise discretion in a reasonable way by selling gas at a commercially 
reasonable price [and because] there are no explicit and unambiguous terms 
in the [lease] to the contrary, Plaintiff has stated a claim for breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing.”201 
Finally, the district court held that Plaintiff did not adequately plead a 
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. “To allege a breach of 
fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must establish that a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship existed between her and the defendants.”202 “[T]he critical 
question is whether the relationship goes beyond mere reliance on superior 
skill, and into a relationship characterized by ‘overmastering influence’ on 
one side or ‘weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed’ on the 
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other side.”203 The district court held that Plaintiff failed to plead facts 
giving rise to a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants: 
“Rather, Plaintiff has pleaded the existence of a contractual relationship in 
which all parties sought to act in their own interest for a mutual benefit.”204 
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